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Abstract
Background:  Achieving universal health insurance coverage by means of different types of
insurance programs may be a pragmatic and feasible approach. However, the fragmentation of the
health financing system may imply costs in terms of varying ability of the insurance programs to
improve access to and reduce spending on care across different population groups. This study
looks at the effect of different types of health insurance programs on the probability of utilizing
care, the intensity of utilization, and individual spending on care in Jordan.
Methods: Using national household survey data collected in 2000 with a sub-sample of around
8,300 individuals, the study applies econometric techniques to a set of specified models along the
two-part model approach to the demand for health care. By means of particular tests and other
procedures, the robustness of the results is controlled.
Results: Around 60 percent of the population is covered by some type of insurance. However,
the distribution varies across income groups, and importantly, the effect of insurance on the
outcome indicators differ substantially across the various programs. Generally, insurance is found
to increase the intensity of utilization and reduce out-of-pocket spending, while no general
insurance effect on the probability of use is found. More specifically, however, these effects are only
found for some programs and not for all. The best performing programs are those to which the
somewhat better off groups have access.
Conclusion: Notwithstanding the empirical nature of the issues, the results point at the need to
assess the effect of insurance coverage more profoundly than what is commonly done. Applying
rigorous analysis to survey data in other settings will contribute to bringing out better evidence on
what types of programs perform most effectively and equitably in different contexts.
Background
Health financing systems vary considerably across coun-
tries and regions in terms of levels, models and organiza-
tional arrangements. While all systems aim at achieving
the main financing functions of raising revenues, pooling
resources for risk sharing, and purchasing services, models
range from universal health insurance coverage by means
of a National Health Service (NHS) system or a social
insurance program in most high-income OECD-coun-
tries, to multiple providers of health care and insurance in
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many middle-income countries (MICs), and finally, to lit-
tle prepayment coverage in a range of low- and middle-
income countries (L&MICs). While it is safe to suggest
that as a result of these variations, outcomes in terms of
access to health care (as seen by utilization rates) and indi-
vidual spending for care vary across health financing sys-
tems, too little is known about the particular effects of
various health financing systems, specifically for L&MICs
[1,2]. These countries frequently display highly frag-
mented financing systems with possibly adverse effects on
access and personal spending. This study aims at contrib-
uting to filling this gap in the current body of evidence by
applying rigorous quantitative methods to household
level data from Jordan to analyze the effect of multiple
health insurance availability in terms of utilization of out-
patient care, intensity of use, and individual out-of-pocket
(OOP) spending on care. Specifically, the study assesses
whether insurance programs differ as to the impact on uti-
lization and spending, and if the impact vary across
income groups.
The specific context and challenges for middle-income
countries have recently been discussed [[1], ch. 8]. Among
other things, it is noted that as levels of health spending
have reached around 5–6 percent of GDP (or, approxi-
mately, US$ 80–100 per capita per year), current health
financing policies aim at providing universal coverage of
health services with a focus on equity in health financing
and efficiency in service provision. Health insurance is a
key instrument in current health financing reforms in
many MICs and it is noted that these countries may need
to use a combination of different insurance schemes to
reach the goals of universal coverage and financial protec-
tion. As is further discussed below, Jordan is in many ways
a case in point: around 10 percent of GDP is spent on
health with multiple insurance options co-existing, while
some 40 percent of the population is without any finan-
cial protection mechanism.
Although there are several important benefits of financing
health care through insurance, the existence of a frag-
mented health insurance system may lead to both ineffi-
ciencies and equity concerns. These concerns may be both
direct and indirect and affect the overall health system as
well as the individual patient. Indirectly, an ineffective
and inequitable financing system may be a source of
social discontent, particularly in a society that spends a
large share on care. An inefficient health protection sys-
tem may have an impact on the ability of the health sys-
tem to achieve its overall policy objectives of health
financing and financial protection. Given the particular
data that are used in this study, a close assessment of the
larger social impacts of the Jordanian health insurance
system is beyond the scope of this paper.
This paper is organized as follows. In the remainder of this
section, a brief discussion of the theory of the demand for
health care and the role of insurance is provided followed
by a description of some key dimensions of the Jordan
health financing system. Section two describes the data
and the methods of the study and section three presents
the findings. Section four discusses the results and the
final section provides some conclusions of the study in
terms of policy and further analysis.
Theory and review of the literature
From a health economics perspective, there are, in princi-
ple, two alternative views on the demand for health care.
One suggestion is that the individual demands care as an
input into her production of health [3]. This view – some-
times referred to as the Grossman model – suggests that
the demand for health care is a derived demand in the
process of investment in health capital. The Grossman
model of the demand for health thus views health care as
an input along with other health inputs such as nutrition
and personal exercise. Specifically, the model views the
individual as the sole decision maker as to if and how
much health care to use.
Over the past decade, however, the Grossman model of
the demand for health has been challenged by a comple-
mentary view that sees the demand for health care within
a principal-agent framework [4]. In this view, the individ-
ual decides if and when to seek health care while the pro-
vider of the services decides how much care to use once
the first decision has been taken. One of the criticisms of
the Grossman model is the fact that many of its predic-
tions are not supported by the empirical analyses; see,
among others, [5] for a recent discussion of these issues.
Depending on the particular view of the demand for
health care that one adopts, the methods for analyzing the
effect of for instance health insurance on the demand for
care will vary. This is further discussed in the Methods sec-
tion below.
The role of insurance in health financing is twofold, one
to raise revenues for health care services, and two, to pool
these resources so that health risks can be effectively
shared among the members of the insurance scheme [6].
Given the uncertainty with which ill health affects a given
individual in the population, risk sharing is both an equi-
table and an effective way of financing health care.
Indeed, important policy outcomes of health insurance
are to improve access to care and to reduce individual
spending at the time of use, which is particularly impor-
tant for those with limited ability to pay. By bringing the
direct price of health care down, consumption of care will
increase, all else considered. However, the extent to which
this occurs in any given context is an empirical issue, given
other factors, such as indirect costs, that may still impedeHealth Research Policy and Systems 2007, 5:6 http://www.health-policy-systems.com/content/5/1/6
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access to care by some groups of the population (other
problems with health insurance are moral hazard and
adverse selection, but these are not the subject of analysis
in this paper).
Based on these theoretical underpinnings, the effect of
health insurance on utilization and expenditures has been
analyzed in different ways in the empirical literature. As
suggested, the general task has been to choose an appro-
priate model to deal with the dual decision process of the
demand for health care, i.e. the first decision to see a
health care provider, and then, the second decision of
how much care to obtain [7,8]. The principal focus of the
sizable literature on health insurance has been the U.S.
health care market with its highly fragmented third-party
payment structure, involving both public and private pro-
grams while at the same time leaving some 16 percent of
the population without health insurance at any given time
[6]. The best known health insurance study is the Rand
Health Insurance Experiment (HIE) [9]. The randomized
design of the HIE provided a unique opportunity to study
the effect of insurance on the health care seeking behavior
of individuals. The RAND study finds, among other
things, evidence for increased health spending when
insurance coverage is complete, compared with incom-
plete coverage.
Another early contribution uses household level data
from Australia to look at two things [10]. First, the authors
develop a microeconomic model for individual choice
under uncertainty for various health insurance programs
and health care types. They find that utilization choices
vary considerably across insurance types, but that health
status proves to be a stronger determinant of utilization of
care than for insurance choice. And second, they find evi-
dence of both self-selection and moral hazard due to
insurance for some health care types although not for all.
In recent years, a small but growing number of studies
have looked at the effect of health insurance on access and
expenditures in low- and middle-income countries. For
Vietnam, one study looks at the effects of voluntary health
insurance on the choice of provider and type of care [11].
Using instrumental variable (IV; to control for the possi-
ble endogenous nature of insurance status) multinomial
logit estimations for a sample of 1,800 individuals and
controlling for, among other factors, individual health
status, the authors find evidence of moral hazard, as
poorer insured persons tend to use inpatient care more
compared with poorer uninsured individuals, a difference
that is not found at higher income levels. In another study
on Vietnam the effect of public voluntary health insurance
on private expenditures is analyzed [12]. Here, the
authors use a version of the Heckman sample selection
bias model to correct for possible endogeneity of the
health insurance status dummy variable. For a sample of
980 individuals, the authors find evidence of an insurance
protection effect while controlling for a set of exogenous
explanatory variables including health status and income.
For a South American country, one study uses probit esti-
mation techniques to study the effect of health insurance
on utilization of curative and preventive care in Ecuador
[13]. Correcting for potential endogeneity the author
finds that in a sample of around 3,300 individuals, insur-
ance has a positive effect on the utilization of curative
care, but only a small effect on preventive care. Finally, the
effect of a national school health insurance program on
utilization and expenditures in Egypt is studied [14].
Using a two-step estimation approach in a sample of
17,000 eligible schoolchildren, the findings suggest that
on average the program increases access to care and
reduces financial outlays.
Although the above studies find a positive insurance effect
on average, the effect is not uniform across income
groups. To assess the role of insurance across various
groups, all of the above studies (with the possible excep-
tion of [13]) use insurance/income interaction terms. The
sign of these variables suggests that this effect varies across
income groups. For example, insurance is found to reduce
health expenditures more for the poor than for the rich in
Vietnam [12]. In Egypt, only the middle-class children
benefited from a reduced financial burden due to insur-
ance. However, it is unclear whether these interaction
effects are computed correctly as the true effect of an inter-
action term in a logit or probit estimation may differ, both
in sign and magnitude as well as in statistical significance,
from the one reported by the initial estimation command
[15,16]. In the statistical software program Stata (used
here), a special 'inteff' command can be invoked to cor-
rectly calculate the interaction effect [16]. Moreover, only
one of the above studies [10] looks at the effect of more
than two insurance programs simultaneously. Thus, this
study contributes to the existing evidence base by analyz-
ing multiple insurance in a middle-income country con-
text and by correctly considering the income interaction
effect.
The Jordanian context
Jordan is a lower middle-income country situated in the
Middle-East with a gross national income (GNI) that is
slightly above that of its regional neighbors [17]. How-
ever, annual economic growth in recent years has been
limited at around 1.5 percent per person. In terms of over-
all health expenditure, Jordan spends considerably more
than do its immediate neighbors- with the exception of
Lebanon – and other MICs: around 9 percent of GDP
compared with 5 percent and 6 percent, respectively.
Almost half of all health care spending is private in theHealth Research Policy and Systems 2007, 5:6 http://www.health-policy-systems.com/content/5/1/6
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form of insurance premiums and as direct out-of-pocket
payments at the time of need. Public spending on health
is mostly directed towards inpatient services with only
around a quarter spent on outpatient care. The single most
expensive part of health care in Jordan is pharmaceuticals
that account for one third of total spending. In combina-
tion with changing demographic and epidemiological
patterns, it is suggested that the country will find it diffi-
cult to sustain such high levels of health spending without
undertaking health financing reform efforts with the over-
all aim of providing effective care while protecting the
population from catastrophic consequences when seeking
care [18,19].
Several actors provide health care services in Jordan, the
largest of which is the Ministry of Health (MoH). Other
providers include the Royal Military Services (RMS), Jor-
dan University Hospital (JUH), and the private sector.
Along with the United Nations' regional refugee program
(UNRWA), these are also the main providers of health
insurance, to which around 60 percent of the population
in Jordan has access. Insurance coverage is higher among
women, elderly, illiterate, and rural population groups.
Of those with insurance, around 11 percent has multiple
insurance coverage, which is less than anticipated prior to
the current survey. See table 1 for more details on, among
other things, insurance coverage.
Separate agreements among the various non-private
insurance programs enable transferability. For example,
anyone insured by MoH can be transferred to the JUH; in
emergency cases such services would be free of charge. The
Ministry of Health's insurance program, Civil Insurance
Program (CIP), covers several groups of people, including
public civil servants and their dependants, government
retirees and their families, beneficiaries of the National
Aid Fund, blood donors, and also the poor, the handi-
capped, and others who are able to pay the premiums.
This program provides treatment free of charge for a list of
diseases and health conditions, including cancer, dialysis,
anemia, and other blood-related diseases.
The JUH insurance program covers University employees
and their families, employees of other universities, and
staff of certain large companies according to special agree-
ments with the University Hospital. The Royal Medical
Services (RMS) insurance program covers the following
categories of individuals: current and retired staff of the
united armed forces, members of the royal court, telecom
company staff and family members, and a variety of mem-
bers of other organizations and entities in the society.
Lastly, UNRWA provides care for around 400,000 Pales-
tinian refugees, most of which is maternal and child
health care. Members of UNRWA can be transferred to a
government hospital through a special agreement with
the Ministry of Health.
Data and methods
The present study uses data from the Jordan Healthcare
Utilization and Expenditure Survey (JHUES) collected in
2000. The survey contained a sample of 8,800 households
and obtained information on each individual within the
household, the head of the household, and detailed
health care utilization and expenditure information on a
randomly selected household member. Essentially, the
JHUES consists of four samples: (i) demographic and
background data on 49,543 individuals, (ii) insurance
coverage on 49,456 individuals, (iii) household data on
8,306 heads of households, and (iv) health care utiliza-
tion and spending data, and self-assessed health (SAH) on
8,306 randomly selected individuals of all ages. Individu-
als from this latter sub-sample are used in the subsequent
analysis.
The survey instrument was divided into seven sections:
the household schedule, health insurance data, outpatient
care utilization (two-week reference period), health sta-
tus, inpatient episodes, mortality, and household condi-
tions, including income and assets. Moreover, the survey
used a complex sample design with seven strata. In the
first stage of the sampling method, the primary sampling
units (psu) were selected within each stratum with a prob-
ability proportional to size (pps). In the second stage, 20
households were randomly selected within each sampling
unit. Finally, as noted, one individual was chosen at ran-
dom within each household. Sampling weights were then
calculated in two steps. First, each observation was
weighted by the inverse of its probability of selection, and
second, the weights were normalized by dividing the first
step probability weights by their average. The sample
design and sampling weights are considered in all esti-
mates in the ensuing analysis; this ensures robust stand-
ard errors of all estimated coefficients.
Descriptive statistics for the main variables are presented
in table 1. During the recall period of two weeks prior to
the survey, a little less than 20 percent of the randomly
interviewed individuals reported having had at least one
spell of illness. Out of those individuals, around 63 per-
cent visited a health care provider for outpatient care, the
vast majority of which made only one visit and only a
handful made more than three visits.
As previously noted, around 64 percent of the Jordanian
population has access to some type of health insurance.
The most common insurance program is the Royal Medi-
cal Services (RMS), which provides health insurance for
43 percent (28 percent of all randomly interviewed indi-
viduals; not shown) of the insured. The program organ-Health Research Policy and Systems 2007, 5:6 http://www.health-policy-systems.com/content/5/1/6
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics
Variable/Indicator Frequency Mean/Share (%) Min Max S.D.
Background indicator(s):
Illness in past 14 days* 1,632 19.65 0 1 -
Dependent variables:
Outpatient visit (if ill)* 1,034 63.3 0 1 -
Intensity of utilization: * 01
• One visit (if visit) 887 86 0 1 -
• Two visits (if one visit) 123 12 0 1 -
• Three visits (if one visit) 18 1.74 0 1 -
• Four visits (if one visit) 4 0.39 0 1 -
• Five visits (if one visit) 1 0.1 0 1 -
• Six visits (if one visit) 1 0.1 0 1 -
Out-of-pocket expenditure (total per episode; current JD) - 5.31 0 400 0.53
Policy variable:
Insured* 5,328 64 0 1 -
• MoH 1,514 28 0 1 -
• RMS 2,312 43 0 1 -
• JUH 68 1 0 1 -
• UNRWA 668 13 0 1 -
• Private 764 14 0 1 -
Control variables:
SES – total household expenditure (current JD) - 222 10 2200 168.26
Age (years) 25.72 0 98 20.31
Male* 4,059 48.87 0 1 -
Education (Completed school years; adults) - 10.66 1 25 3.44
Marital status* 3,014 36.29 0 1 -
Labor status: paid employee* 2,001 24,09 0 1 -
Health status:*
• Regular visit to health care provider for chronic illness 1,487 17.9 0 1
• Regular medication 1,192 14.34 0 1 -
• Self-assessed health: Better 1,962 23.62 0 1 -
• Self-assessed health: Similar 5,696 68.58 0 1 -
• Self-assessed health: Worse 648 7.8 0 1 -
• North* 2,349 28.28 0 1 -
• Central* 4,113 49.52 0 1 -
• South* 1,844 22.20 0 1 -
Urban* 5,967 71.84 0 1 -
Own house* 5,533 66.61 0 1 -
Full sample (random individuals) 8,306 - - - -
Source: JHES 2000. - = not applicable. * = binary indicator variable.Health Research Policy and Systems 2007, 5:6 http://www.health-policy-systems.com/content/5/1/6
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ized by the Ministry of Health (CIP) provides insurance
for another 28 percent (18 percent) of the insured while
the Jordanian University Hospital (JUH) program only
reaches a little more than one percent (less than 1 percent)
of the insured individuals. Some 14 percent (9 percent) of
those with insurance have some form of private health
insurance, and finally, the UN special program for the Pal-
estinian refugees in Jordan (UNRWA) provide health
insurance for around 13 percent (8 percent) of all those
insured.
Information on health insurance status is provided in two
places in the questionnaire: first, for all individuals in the
survey (n = 49,456) regardless of possible health care uti-
lization during the recall period, and second, for all of the
randomly interviewed persons given that they visited a
health care service provider at least once during the recall
period. Below the first source of information is used so as
to be able to gauge the effect of insurance on utilization
regardless of whether a provider was visited or not during
illness. Moreover, the Jordan survey collected information
on health care utilization for specific illnesses, as opposed
to any illness in the recall period. This means that the
potential problem of independence between illness and
utilization is taken care of, which, in turn, speaks in favor
of applying the two-part approach to the analysis of
health care demand [7].
Econometric considerations
In the subsequent analysis, there are at least three specific
econometric considerations that require special attention.
First, as mentioned earlier, using interaction terms in logit
and probit models calls for the application of extended
estimation commands in some standard econometric
software programs, including Stata [15,16].
Second, the coefficients of the various explanatory varia-
bles may be biased and inconsistent if some of them cor-
relate with the error term in the econometric models
below, suggesting that they are endogenous. In particular,
the health insurance status indicator variable may be sus-
pected of being endogenous due to unobserved heteroge-
neity if individuals self-select into their insurance status
on account of some factor not controlled for and thus
contained in the error term in the estimation models [See,
for example, [20]].
There are several factors that are not immediately
observed why individuals may opt to buy or obtain (a spe-
cific type of) health insurance. For example, to the extent
that obtaining insurance is costly, richer individuals may
choose to buy insurance expecting to utilize health care in
the future. Also, health insurance may be associated with
a certain type of employment either in the private or the
public (including military) sectors. Individuals may then
opt to seek certain types of jobs partly with a view to
obtaining health insurance in anticipation of future
health care needs. Finally, people with poorer health may
choose to obtain health insurance due to higher expecta-
tions of utilizing health care.
By including measures of these and other factors in the
models, attempts are made to control for the potential
endogeneity of the insurance variable. In addition, a test
for endogeneity of the insurance variable is performed
using a version of the Durbin-Wu-Hausman class of tests
for endogeneity [21]. Failure to reject the null hypothesis
of no correlation between the error term and any of the
regressors in such a test would suggest that some of the
regressors are endogenous, which, in turn, would suggest
a failure to properly identify the regression equation. One
way of handling endogeneity would be to use instrumen-
tal variable (IV) estimation techniques. While obtaining
valid instruments for the endogenous variables is no easy
task, and using poor instruments may be inferior to using
the possibly endogenous variable and accounting for bias,
some instruments that have been suggested in the litera-
ture on the demand for health and insurance include the
relationship of the individual to the head of household
and mean rate of affiliation of the insurance type in the
community [13]. This type of information is available
from the JHES 2000 survey, although whether they pro-
vide valid instruments in this case needs to be tested for-
mally.
The final issue concerns the applicability of the count data
model. While a Poisson distribution may be assumed in
count data on the number of visits to a provider, the actual
estimation of the count model by means of Poisson esti-
mation methods may be inappropriate due to the rather
restrictive assumptions of the Poisson model. In particu-
lar, the model assumes that the mean of the expected
number of counts (or, events) is equal to the variance. Fre-
quently in empirical situations, this assumption is known
to be violated due to overdispersion. A formal test of over-
dispersion may be applied, the outcome of which may
suggest an alternative estimation method, such as a nega-
tive binomial (negbin) approach [20,21]. Also, the Pois-
son model assumes that visits are independent, which
clearly is a strong assumption given that referrals most
likely require the active decision of a GP or similar pro-
vider. Finally, the count data on the number of visits to an
outpatient provider is truncated, which will have addi-
tional implications for the choice of estimation method
[20].
Econometric models
The current set of analyses attempt to assess the effect of
insurance on health care utilization and on subsequent
payments for care by means of econometric estimation ofHealth Research Policy and Systems 2007, 5:6 http://www.health-policy-systems.com/content/5/1/6
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three separately specified models as outlined below. The
key variable of interest is thus 'insurance status', which is
a dummy variable taking the value 1 if the individual has
health insurance and 0 otherwise. To further gauge the
insurance effect, the study allows for the interaction
between insurance status and an indicator of individual
(or household) socioeconomic status. Here, total house-
hold monthly consumption expenditure divided by the
square root of household size to get a per capita measure
and control for household size, is taken as that indicator.
Based on theory and empirical experience, insurance sta-
tus is expected to improve access to care and to reduce
payments for services. While the data generating process
(DGP) underlying these decisions is admittedly complex,
the econometric approach essentially depends on the
nature of the data and the information they contain about
the dependent variables. This issue has been discussed in
the literature [22], and a taxonomy to help choose the cor-
rect model has been suggested. Based on the discussion,
this study adopts the approach of the 'two-part model'
(TPM) to assess the effect of insurance on utilization and
expenditures.
Formally, the econometric models are the following,
where the individual subscript i = (1,...,N) is suppressed
for notational simplicity. The probability of a health care
visit conditional on being ill is estimated by the probabil-
ity model
Prob(utilization>0|ill) = βX+ε (1)
where X is a set of covariates, including health insurance
status. This model is linear in the log of the odds (logit) of
the event, in this case visiting a provider when ill.
The intensity of health care utilization is analyzed by
means of a 0-truncated negative binomial (0-negbin)
model since the focus of analysis is the number of visits
conditional on at least one visit to a service provider. The
negative binomial takes the following general form:
where y is a health care visit ranging from one to, in this
case, six visits, and Γ(·) is the gamma function.
Finally, out-of-pocket expenditures conditional on posi-
tive utilization of outpatient care is estimated by OLS of
the log-linear model
Log(OOP|utilization > 0) = γX+μ (3)
Again, X is a set of explanatory variables, including insur-
ance status. In models (1) and (3), β and γ are the coeffi-
cients to be estimated and ε and μ are error terms; in
model (2), μ is the expected number of counts or, here,
outpatient visits.
In order to be able to draw a ceteris paribus conclusion as
to the insurance effect, the study controls for a number of
individual, household, and community factors. The indi-
vidual factors include age and gender, educational, civil
and occupational status, and nationality. There are few
convincing a priori reasons to expect these variables to
affect utilization and payments in any special direction as
these effects are largely empirical. The study does, how-
ever, also control for the health status of the individual
and it is expected that, all other things being equal, poorer
health status leads to larger health care needs and possibly
larger health care expenditures.
Household factors include income (as measured by con-
sumption expenditure) and other living conditions of the
household. Although these factors are suggested to influ-
ence the dependent variables in models (1) – (3), the
expected sign of the estimated coefficients of these varia-
bles is indecisive, again due to the empirical nature of
these effects. Community factors include the presence of a
health care provider nearby and a regional dummy varia-
ble. Living close to a health service provider is expected to
increase the probability of utilization.
Results
This section presents the findings from the two sets of
quantitative analyses. The first part presents the results
from looking at the bivariate relationships between the
key variables. The findings from this exercise will provide
an initial indication of the effect of insurance on utiliza-
tion and spending on outpatient care. The second part
presents the findings from the econometric estimation of
models (1) – (3) presented above.
Bivariate analysis: distribution and relationship of 
insurance, health, and utilization by SES
It was previously noted that overall insurance coverage in
Jordan is around 60 percent of the population. Further
analysis of the data suggests that being insured varies by
socioeconomic status. For example, in the poorest income
quintile, 45 percent do not have health insurance com-
pared with 32 percent in the richest groups (table 2).
These differences are statistically significant.
Moreover, the various income groups in Jordan have
access to different types of insurance programs (table 3).
The poorest group predominantly relies on the RMS,
MoH, and the UNRWA programs, and only very few num-
bers of poor have access to private insurance or the JUH
Pr( | )
()
!( )
() () yx
y
y
y =
+ −
− ++
−
−
−
−
Γ
Γ
α
α
α
αμ
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αμ
1
1
1
1
1
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insurance program. In contrast, the richest 20 percent of
the population with access to health insurance rely on
MoH, private insurance, and RMS. In addition, some 42
percent of all those insured by JUH belong to the richest
SES quintile. The findings that insurance status and type
of insurance vary across socioeconomic status are statisti-
cally significant at the 1 percent level.
Insurance status also varies across health. However, there
is no clear pattern in this regard. For example, the hypoth-
esis that self-assessed health is independent from insur-
ance cannot be rejected at the 10 percent significance level
(not shown). On the other hand, reported illness is asso-
ciated with insurance status (p = 0.01), such that those
with insurance have a higher probability of reporting an
illness. This is in itself an interesting finding that might
suggest some process of moral hazard-like behaviour
among the insured. Further analysis of this would, how-
ever, require more detailed data than are available in the
current survey.
Regarding the bivariate relationships between health
insurance (and type of insurance) and utilization of care
and OOP spending on care, the following is noted. There
is no evidence that utilization is associated with insurance
status when looking at the sub-sample that reported an ill-
ness during the recall period. There is, however, some
indication that utilization vary by type of health insurance
(not shown). In particular, utilization seems to be associ-
ated with access to the CIP program and to private health
insurance (p-values = 0.08 and 0.06, respectively), but not
to the other types of insurance programs. Furthermore,
there is no indication in the data that the intensity of use
of outpatient services varies by insurance status or by type
of health insurance. There are indications that utilization
of outpatient care varies by insurance status for the poor-
est income group, but not for the more well-off groups.
Health status seems to vary across the income groups. For
example, self-assessed health (SAH) and reported illness
during the recall period both vary statistically significantly
across income groups. Among those who consider them-
selves in worse health than their peers, 43 percent belong
to the poorest income group compared with only 10 per-
cent from the richest group. Conversely, 17 percent of
those who consider themselves in better health than their
matching group belong to the poorest income group com-
pared with more than 30 percent from the richest group.
Similarly, of those who reported being ill during the recall
period, some 63 percent belong to the three poorest
groups compared with around 33 percent from the two
richest groups (table 4).
Finally, the data show that out-of-pocket spending varies
across health insurance types with those with access to pri-
vate health insurance paying the most on average and
those with RMS insurance paying the least (not shown).
Furthermore, there is evidence in the data that poorer
groups spend on average less compared with richer groups
(not shown). On the other hand, looking at OOP spend-
ing across income groups for the insured and the non-
insured, it seems the "insurance effect" (ratio between
mean OOP spending of non-insured over insured) is larg-
est in the higher income groups as the insured in these
groups seem to spend relatively less than the uninsured
compared with the poorer groups.
In summary, this section has shown that insurance cover-
age and its effect on utilization and spending is far from
even across socioeconomic status in Jordan. The further
exploration of the insurance effect, however, requires that
other factors that also affect utilization and OOP pay-
ments are controlled for. This is done in the next section.
Multivariate analysis: utilization, intensity of use, and 
OOP spending
Table 5 presents the estimation results of model (1), prob-
ability of health care utilization conditional on illness in
the past two weeks prior to the survey. Column (1) shows
the preferred base model after a series of restrictions has
been imposed on a selection of the explanatory variables.
Generally, neither income nor insurance significantly
increase the probability of making a visit to a health serv-
ice provider when ill. Instead, the model shows that
health status is the most important factor determining
outpatient use as those in worse health, as indicated by
the self-assessed health indicator and the presence of a
chronic illness significantly increase health care utiliza-
tion. Notably, findings suggest that people increasingly
seek less care as they grow older. Compared with those in
the central part of the country, those in the north utilize
less care. There is no indication that sex or education
determines the use of health services. The specified mod-
els only explain a share of the variation in health care uti-
lization as indicated by relatively low R-squared values
(not shown).
Column (2) performs the same analysis using a disaggre-
gated health insurance status indicator. This exercise
shows that the initial result discussed above does not cor-
rectly explain the effect of insurance on outpatient use in
Jordan. Rather, the disaggregated indicator shows that
those with access to the Ministry of Health insurance pro-
gram CIP have a significantly higher probability of seek-
ing outpatient care than others. As expected, the
coefficients of the other explanatory variables remain
largely unchanged.
The third column shows that the insurance-income inter-
action variable is significantly negative suggesting that, asHealth Research Policy and Systems 2007, 5:6 http://www.health-policy-systems.com/content/5/1/6
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income increases insurance becomes a gradually less
important factor to explain utilization of outpatient care.
The interaction effects are largely confirmed by the use of
the 'inteff'-  command in Stata (these results are not
shown for reasons of space, but are available from the
author upon request). The effect is considerably more var-
ied, however, for people having a probability of visiting
an outpatient provider of around 0.2 compared with a
higher probability. Moreover, the true interaction effect
does not differ significantly from zero for the sample of
individuals in the middle of the probability spectrum.
Finally, we learn that the mean interaction effect is -0.05
with a standard error of 0.02 (z statistic is -1.57), i.e.
somewhat larger in absolute terms than initially shown in
table 5.
Results from the analysis of the impact of health insurance
on the intensity of health care utilization, model (2) are
presented in table 6. While the interpretation of the coef-
ficients of the count data model is relatively straightfor-
ward [see, for example, [23], for details], the focus here is
principally on the sign of the coefficients. Column (1)
Table 2: Tabulation of income and insurance status
Income quintile
12345 T o t a l
Insured?
No 1,023 571 672 315 397 2,978
34.35 19.17 22.57 10.58 13.33 100.00
44.67 32.55 32.67 32.54 32.09 35.85
Yes 1,267 1,183 1,385 653 840 5,328
23.78 22.20 25.99 12.26 15.77 100.00
55.33 67.45 67.33 67.46 67.91 64.15
Total 2,290 1,754 2,057 968 1,237 8,306
27.57 21.12 24.77 11.65 14.89 100.00
100 100 100 100 100 100
Pearson chi-squared(4) = 107.03, Pr = 0.00
Source: JHUES 2000
Table 3: Tabulation of income and type of insurance, Jordan 2000
Income quintile
12345 T o t a l
Insurance type
MoH-CIP 395 291 378 189 261 1,514
26.09 19.22 24.97 12.48 17.24 100.00
31.18 24.60 27.31 28.94 31.11 28.43
RMS 542 643 625 255 247 2,312
23.44 27.81 27.03 11.03 10.68 100.00
42.78 54.35 45.16 39.05 29.44 43.41
JUH 7 6 11 16 28 68
10.29 8.82 16.18 23.53 41.18 100.00
0.55 0.51 0.79 2.45 3.34 1.28
UNRWA 260 150 158 56 44 668
38.92 22.46 23.65 8.38 6.59 100.00
20.52 12.68 11.42 8.58 5.24 12.54
Private 63 93 212 137 259 764
8.25 12.17 27.75 17.93 33.90 100.00
4.97 7.86 15.32 20.98 30.87 14.34
Total 1,267 1,183 1,384 653 839 5,326
23.79 22.21 25.99 12.26 15.75 100.00
100 100 100 100 100 100
Pearson chi-square(16) = 537.19, Pr = 0.00
Source: JUHES 2000Health Research Policy and Systems 2007, 5:6 http://www.health-policy-systems.com/content/5/1/6
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shows that having access to some type of health insurance
significantly increases utilization of health care compared
with being exempted to pay for care.
In addition, compared with those with better self-assessed
health status, those with similar and worse health use
more care, as does having a more serious illness. While
these results are in line with expectations, it might also be
noted that proximity to a provider does not significantly
determine intensity of outpatient use. Age does not
explain intensity of use, while being married and living in
the central part of the country significantly increases out-
patient utilization. Finally, being a paid employee signifi-
cantly reduces the number of outpatient visits per illness
episode.
The results shown in column (2) indicate that the insur-
ance effect differs significantly across insurance programs.
The MoH and the RMS programs significantly increase the
number of visits to a provider when ill. This effect is not
seen in any of the other included insurance programs. In
line with the results in the previous sub-section, the find-
ings suggest that access to care varies by insurance affilia-
tion. Column (3) shows that in contrast to the finding in
model (1), the income-insurance interaction term is not
statistically significant.
Table 7 shows the effects of health insurance on levels of
health care spending, model (3). As in the previous anal-
yses, column one shows the base model with the aggre-
gate health insurance dummy variable. The results suggest
that, generally, health insurance in Jordan significantly
reduces levels of health spending on outpatient care. The
results also indicate that those with higher incomes, live
near a provider, reside in the central part of the country,
and have worse health pay more for care compared with
their respective counter groups.
Column (2) shows the disaggregated insurance effect. As
with the above analyzes, the true effect of insurance
depends on the particular type of program. Specifically,
those with access to the CIP and RMS programs pay signif-
icantly less than those with no insurance, while this effect
is not found for the other programs.
The third column of table 7 shows that the income-insur-
ance interaction term is significantly negative, suggesting
that it is the more well-off groups that benefit from the
financial protection effect of having insurance. In line
with this result, the last column shows the results of divid-
ing the households into three groups based on income.
This suggests that compared with the poorest households,
higher income groups pay significantly less for outpatient
care.
Discussion
This paper analyzes the impact of various types of health
insurance programs on outpatient health care utilization
and subsequent spending on care in Jordan with a specific
focus on effects across socioeconomic status. Applying
specific quantitative techniques to individual level survey
data, the study has been able to reveal evidence that the
effect of health insurance on these outcomes varies by
type of insurance and socioeconomic status. This section
discusses these findings and the validity of the results,
starting with some methodological considerations.
Methods
A general point is the reference to the principal-agent
framework in the beginning of the paper. The methodo-
logical approach has been largely built on an assumption
that the individual decides on the initial choice of care
and the provider decides on subsequent utilization of
care, single-handedly or in collaboration with the patient.
The role of insurance has then been the particular objec-
Table 4: Tabulation of income and reported illness, Jordan 2000
Income quintile
12345 T o t a l
Illness in past 2 weeks?
No reported illness 1,831 1,375 1,632 807 1,029 6,674
27.43 20.60 24.45 12.09 15.42 100.00
79.96 78.39 79.34 83.37 83.19 80.35
Reported illness 4 5 93 7 94 2 51 6 12 0 81 , 6 3 2
28.13 23.22 26.04 9.87 12.75 100.00
20.04 21.61 20.66 16.63 16.81 19.65
Total 2,290 1,754 2,057 968 1,237 8,306
27.57 21.12 24.77 11.65 14.89 100.00
100 100 100 100 100 100
Pearson chi-square(4) = 17.7, Pr = 0.00
Source: JUHES 2000Health Research Policy and Systems 2007, 5:6 http://www.health-policy-systems.com/content/5/1/6
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tive of the study. A specific issue to note is the relatively
low overall explanatory power of these econometric mod-
els. The fact that they only explain a share of the determi-
nants of the outcomes is not surprising given the cross-
sectional nature of the data [24]. On the other hand, the
rigorous application of suitable econometric models that
are in turn based on theory and empirical experience
hopefully ensures that the explanatory power of the anal-
ysis sufficiently increases the validity of the results to be of
actual policy relevance.
Furthermore, the above models have been subjected to a
number of specification and diagnostic tests. In particular,
the possible endogeneity of health insurance in models
(1) and (3) has been tested by means of the aforemen-
tioned Durbin-Wu-Hausman (DWH) test. The insurance
variable (hins) would be endogenous in, for example,
model (1) if Cov(hins,ε) differs from 0, where hins ∈ X in
(1) and (3). This would render the coefficient of hins
biased and inconsistent. The test is performed as follows.
Table 5: Estimation of model (1) Probability of outpatient use, Jordan 2000
Dependent variable: Visited outpatient provider when ill (1) (2) (3)
INCOME 0.125 0.127 0.345**
[0.12] [0.12] [0.15]
INSURED 0.158 1.763**
[0.14] [0.83]
AGE -0.0533*** -0.0537*** -0.0282**
[0.020] [0.019] [0.014]
AGE^2 0.000490* 0.000496* 0.000214
[0.00026] [0.00026] [0.00018]
MALE -0.127 -0.119 0.0481
[0.16] [0.16] [0.13]
JORDANIAN -0.224 -0.231 -0.327
[0.36] [0.36] [0.30]
EDUCATION 0.0159 0.0157 -0.00979
[0.020] [0.020] [0.014]
MARRIED 0.339* 0.338* 0.168
[0.19] [0.19] [0.16]
PAID EMPLOYEE 0.215 0.229 0.176
[0.21] [0.21] [0.18]
SAH-similar 0.200 0.198 0.172
[0.16] [0.16] [0.13]
SAH-worse 0.434* 0.430* 0.425**
[0.25] [0.25] [0.20]
CHRONIC ILLNESS 0.665*** 0.664*** 0.638***
[0.25] [0.25] [0.22]
DISABLED > 3 days 0.682*** 0.683*** 0.630***
[0.25] [0.24] [0.17]
CENTRAL REGION -0.101 -0.0950 -0.0601
[0.15] [0.15] [0.14]
NORTH REGION -0.530*** -0.532*** -0.541***
[0.15] [0.15] [0.14]
MOH insurance 0.341*
[0.19]
RMS insurance 0.119
[0.16]
JUH insurance -0.0906
[0.64]
UNRWA 0.229
[0.23]
PRIVATE insurance 0.165
[0.26]
INC*INSURANCE -0.344*
[0.19]
Constant 0.579 0.532 -0.531
[0.62] [0.62] [0.72]
Observations 1632 1632 1632
Robust standard errors in brackets. * 10%, **5%, ***1%Health Research Policy and Systems 2007, 5:6 http://www.health-policy-systems.com/content/5/1/6
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First, regress hins on all other exogenous variables, includ-
ing the selected IVs (in this case, government affiliation,
work status, and Palestinian). Obtain the reduced form
residual terms, say,  . Include   in (1) and formally test
if the coefficient for   is statistically significant from zero
(H0: βhins_resM = 0). Failure to reject the null hypothesis
would suggest that hins is exogenous in (1). The test indi-
cates that health insurance is not endogenous in model
(1); chi2(1) = 0.01, prob(chi2) = 0.93.

ν

ν

ν
Table 6: Estimation of model (2): Intensity of outpatient use, Jordan 2000
Dependent variable: Total number of visits conditional on at least one visit (1) (2) (3)
INCOME -0.170 -0.181 -0.327
[0.16] [0.17] [0.28]
INSURED 0.342* -0.631
[0.20] [1.44]
AGE 0.00183 0.00179 0.00225
[0.022] [0.022] [0.022]
AGE^2 -0.000108 -0.000123 -0.000109
[0.00030] [0.00030] [0.00030]
MALE -0.238 -0.224 -0.231
[0.20] [0.20] [0.20]
JORDANIAN -0.264 -0.367 -0.274
[0.42] [0.43] [0.42]
EDUCATION 0.0268 0.0313 0.0257
[0.023] [0.023] [0.023]
MARRIED 0.491* 0.476* 0.487*
[0.26] [0.25] [0.25]
PAID EMPLOYEE -0.501* -0.496* -0.495*
[0.27] [0.27] [0.27]
SAH-similar 0.771*** 0.775*** 0.763***
[0.28] [0.28] [0.28]
SAH-worse 0.995*** 1.009*** 0.988***
[0.33] [0.33] [0.33]
CHRONIC ILLNESS 0.408 0.407 0.399
[0.29] [0.29] [0.29]
DISABLED > 3 days 0.658*** 0.660*** 0.653***
[0.20] [0.20] [0.20]
NEAR PROVIDER 0.0506 -0.0439 0.0408
[0.23] [0.24] [0.23]
CENTRAL 0.385* 0.454** 0.399*
[0.21] [0.22] [0.21]
NORTH 0.00959 -0.00774 0.0126
[0.24] [0.24] [0.24]
MOH insurance 0.385*
[0.22]
RMS insurance 0.574***
[0.22]
JUH insurance -0.808
[1.07]
UNRWA 0.0862
[0.30]
PRIVATE insurance 0.0724
[0.32]
INC*INSURANCE 0.228
[0.33]
Constant -2.182** -2.002** -1.492
[0.98] [0.99] [1.39]
lnAlpha 0.0181 -0.0894 -0.00445
[1.02] [1.00] [1.01]
Observations 1034 1034 1034
Robust standard errors in brackets. * 10%, **5%, ***1%Health Research Policy and Systems 2007, 5:6 http://www.health-policy-systems.com/content/5/1/6
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In addition, residual analysis (specifically the Cook's Dis-
tance statistica) suggested that a handful of observations
might be suspected of being outliers, with large influence
on the final estimation results. However, repeating the
Table 7: Estimation of model (3): Outpatient care expenditures, Jordan 2000
Dependent variable: Total OOP spending per episode (1) (2) (3) (4)
INCOME 2.298*** 2.363*** 3.941***
[0.52] [0.54] [0.97]
INSURED -2.649*** 9.821** -2.657***
[0.62] [4.22] [0.64]
AGE -0.0278 -0.0400 -0.0246 -0.0547
[0.075] [0.075] [0.075] [0.073]
AGE^2 0.000542 0.000727 0.000480 0.000912
[0.0011] [0.0011] [0.0011] [0.0011]
MALE 0.312 0.255 0.176 0.410
[0.52] [0.52] [0.52] [0.52]
JORDANIAN -2.867 -2.498 -2.784 -2.697
[2.67] [2.74] [2.66] [2.65]
EDUCATION 0.143 0.156 0.140 0.180*
[0.11] [0.11] [0.10] [0.11]
MARRIED 0.194 0.296 0.292 0.353
[0.76] [0.76] [0.76] [0.77]
PAID EMPLOYEE -0.0656 -0.162 -0.214 -0.0212
[1.04] [1.04] [1.07] [1.04]
SAH-similar 1.864*** 1.809*** 1.846*** 1.729***
[0.52] [0.52] [0.52] [0.51]
SAH-worse 0.478 0.327 0.549 0.0192
[0.75] [0.73] [0.74] [0.75]
CHRONIC ILLNESS 3.825* 3.892* 3.917* 3.837*
[2.19] [2.20] [2.20] [2.18]
DISABLED > 3 days 3.254** 3.215** 3.263** 3.223**
[1.31] [1.30] [1.31] [1.30]
NEAR PROVIDER 3.213*** 3.329*** 3.268*** 3.157***
[0.56] [0.57] [0.56] [0.56]
CENTRAL 1.797*** 1.590*** 1.651*** 1.943***
[0.43] [0.47] [0.42] [0.45]
NORTH -0.681 -0.684 -0.730* -0.700*
[0.42] [0.44] [0.43] [0.42]
MOH insurance -2.934***
[0.57]
RMS insurance -2.802***
[0.57]
JUH insurance -2.353
[1.75]
UNRWA -0.844
[0.79]
PRIVATE insurance -1.371
[1.32]
INC*INSURANCE -2.867***
[1.05]
Tertial richest -2.443***
[0.83]
Tertial middle -1.348
[0.95]
Constant -7.420** -7.953** -14.51*** 3.919
[3.02] [3.13] [4.38] [2.67]
Observations 8306 8306 8306 8306
R-squared 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.10
Robust standard errors in brackets. * 10%, ** 5%, ***1%Health Research Policy and Systems 2007, 5:6 http://www.health-policy-systems.com/content/5/1/6
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analysis while excluding these suspected observations did
not in any way change the results.
Finally, all of the model estimations were bootstrapped to
obtain an indication of the robustness of the results. The
findings of this analysis suggested that the estimated coef-
ficients only have small biases; differences were found in
the fourth or fifth decimal place.
Utilization of and spending on outpatient care
All three models illustrate the main point of this analysis,
that the true impact of insurance may be hidden when
only looking at the aggregate effect. Specifically, model
(1) shows that, in general, health insurance does not affect
the probability of utilizing health care. However, the true
effect of insurance is revealed by looking at the specific
programs. It is then shown that the Civil Insurance Pro-
gram significantly increases the probability of seeking care
when ill (p < 0.1).
In terms of the intensity of outpatient care, the various
insurance programs in Jordan have very different effects.
While the analysis showed that insurance in general sig-
nificantly increased the number of visits per illness epi-
sode, the large insurance programs run by the Ministry of
Health and the Royal Medical Services largely explained
this result. The other programs did not affect the number
of outpatient visits.
The effects of health insurance on health care expendi-
tures is somewhat mixed in the above analysis. Generally,
there is a suggestion that overall spending is reduced by
insurance. However, looking across table 7 shows that this
result is not robust across alternative specifications and
analyses suggesting that further assessment may be war-
ranted to shed light on this issue.
Several important factors may explain many of the find-
ings. One obvious factor that drives the results is the het-
erogeneity of the Jordanian health financing system and,
in particular, the compartmentalization of the various
financing schemes. The very existence of these different
programs and an inability to effectively overcome this
nature of the health financing system are reflected in the
results and, importantly, in the current reform aims of the
government of Jordan [18,19]. As pointed out by one
commentator of this paper, recent innovations by the
Royal Court – a centrally funded program to assist, in par-
ticular, poor people with no other insurance option – will
clearly contribute to increasing the real coverage rate of
the country and newer assessments using more recent data
may be able to pick this up. In the current analysis, any
impact of this program is picked up by controlling for
income.
Obtaining a more unified system will most likely contrib-
ute to reducing these varying effects across socioeconomic
groups and insurance types. In this process, there are, of
course, several alternative options, one of which is to
obtain a more coherent legislative framework so that the
different programs are obliged to cover some level of min-
imum care, while simultaneously allowing increased
transferability between programs. In addition, although it
is beyond the ability of this study to say with any certainty,
it is possible that such a health financing system would
have favorable social impacts by contributing to generat-
ing a coherent social security arrangement.
Conclusion
As countries are trying to achieve universal coverage of
health care services to its citizens by means of increasing
prepayment programs, reform efforts will most likely
make use of several types of insurance programs, both
compulsory and voluntary. While such approaches can be
seen as the most pragmatic given economic and institu-
tional constraints to the ability to rapidly expand govern-
ment programs, this study has shown that these processes
may come at some cost in terms of socioeconomic ine-
quality as different insurance programs are associated
with varying ability to provide access to care and financial
protection.
The empirical nature of these issues suggests at least three
implications that need to be taken into consideration.
First, the results from this study are likely to have small
external validity, which, in turn, suggests the second
point, that similar analysis should be undertaken in other
settings. The combined implications of these two points is
that once a sufficiently large number of similar studies
have been undertaken that looks systematically at the par-
ticular effects of various health insurance types, systematic
reviews can be done to draw more general conclusions as
to the most preferred models of health insurance in vari-
ous settings.
Finally, in terms of policy, this study has highlighted the
need for analysts and decision makers to be adamant of
the efficiency and equity implications of trying to achieve
universal coverage of health services by means of health
insurance. Continuous monitoring and rigorous evalua-
tion of the potentially varying real coverage of existing
policy instruments will remain at the top of the health
reform agenda in low- and middle-income countries for
many years to come.
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